Using carbon pricing revenues to finance infrastructure access
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Abstract. Introducing a price on greenhouse gas emissions would not only contribute to
reducing the risk of dangerous anthropogenic climate change, but would also generate
substantial public revenues. Some of these revenues could be used to cover investment
needs for infrastructure providing access to water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications and transport. In this way, emission pricing could promote sustainable
socio-economic development by safeguarding the stability of natural systems which
constitute the material basis of economies while at the same time providing public
goods that are essential for human well- being. An analysis of several climate scenarios
with different stabilization targets and technological assumptions reveals that emission
pricing has a substantial potential to close existing access gaps.
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1. Introduction
Recent research has pointed out the dangers of continued global warming (IPCC 2014a).
A projected increase of the global mean temperature of 4°C or more in the year 2100
would entail potentially serious consequences for e.g. sea-level rise, water availability,
agricultural productivity, and human health (World Bank 2012). In order to achieve
reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to a level that keeps these risks at a
socially acceptable level, a price on emissions is frequently highlighted as the most
efficient policy (Edenhofer et al. 2013). Recent literature has furthermore highlighted
that countries have multiple incentives to impose a price on emissions, including the
possibility to generate revenue in a way that is less distorting than taxing labour or
capital (Edenhofer et al. 2015). Popular approaches for emission pricing include
emission taxes and tradable permit schemes, as well as hybrid schemes (Goulder and
Parry 2008). This paper argues that emission pricing would not only contribute toward
climate change mitigation, but could also advance human well-being by providing the
financial means to promote access to basic infrastructures, including water, sanitation,
electricity, telecommunication, and transport. Access to these infrastructure services is
a fundamental underpinning of human development understood as creating the
capabilities for individuals to achieve their personal objectives (Drèze and Sen 2013).
Even though investments in the respective infrastructures are likely to yield large
returns (Calderon and Serven 2014), in the absence of stable institutions and without
access to capital markets, many poor people in developing countries will find it difficult
to pool the dividends they will thusly receive for these investments (Estache and Fay
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2007). Infrastructure gaps are still high with many people lacking access to electricity
and water and sanitation. According to the World Development Indicators (World Bank
2014) more than 2.4 billion people world-wide did not have access to sanitation in 2010,
for example (see also Table 1 below). In this study we argue that pricing of greenhouse
gas emissions constitutes a promising option to finance at least some part of the
investments needed to close existing access gaps. Investing revenues from emission
pricing in infrastructure could also create synergies between climate change mitigation
and adaptation, as areas lacking access to infrastructure services are particularly
vulnerable to climate impacts (Malik and Smith 2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section reviews the literature,
while the third section explains how we calculate revenues from emission pricing and
the costs to close gaps to universal access to the different types of infrastructure.
Section 4 presents the results drawing first conclusions on implications of our proposal
for different regions. Section 5 carries out a sensitivity analyses in order to test for the
robustness of our insights. The final section concludes and presents policy implications.

2. Literature Review
This paper combines three different strands of literature. First, it follows previous
studies estimating infrastructure investment needs. Previous studies, on which our
analysis builds, have examined the financial needs to provide universal electricity access
Pachauri et al. (2013) and the investments in water and sanitation (Hutton et al. 2012)
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required to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, without focusing on the
question of how these investments could be financed.
Second, our paper draws on the literature on emission pricing. Most of this literature is
concerned with the optimal choice of policy instrument, i.e. under which conditions it is
more favourable to employ a price or a quantity instrument (Goulder and Parry 2008).
The revenue raising aspect of emission taxes is at the centre of the ‘double-dividend’
literature, which discusses how revenues from emission taxes can improve economic
performance by lowering other, distortionary taxes, e.g. on labour and capital (Goulder
2013). In a similar vein, recent literature has pointed out the potential welfare
improvements by influencing the composition of investors’ portfolios in the presence of
fixed factors of production (Edenhofer, Mattauch, and Siegmeier 2013). By contrast,
using emission pricing to finance infrastructure investment has only received scant
attention in the literature. One study in this direction is Mattauch et al. (2013), who
point out how taxing fixed factors – such as a given ‘carbon budget’, i.e. a fixed amount
of emissions – eliminates the trade-off between public good provision and the
disadvantages of distortionary taxation.
Third, our paper is related to the sustainable development literature. Imposing a limit
on the amount of emissions that can be released to the atmosphere can be regarded as
an operationalization of the concept of ‘strong sustainability’, which states that some
natural thresholds that must under no means be violated (Neumayer 2010). Recent
literature has proposed to combine these natural boundaries with socio-economic limits
to define so-called ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ (Griggs et al. 2013). An approach to
4

balance environmental and social objectives is exemplified by Jakob and Edenhofer
(2014), who identify management of a portfolio of (natural as well as constructed)
capital stocks as the overarching goal of policy making and recommend taxing resource
use and environmental externalities to finance infrastructure investments (see also
Edenhofer et al. 2014).
Our paper is to our knowledge the first to examine the empirical relevance of using the
revenues from carbon pricing in order to promote human development by means of
providing access to basic infrastructure services, such as water, sanitation, electricity,
transport and telecommunication. By focusing on basic services, our paper can perhaps
best be regarded as an application of the concept of multi-dimensional deprivation
(Alkire 2002) in the spirit of Sen’s ‘capabilities approach’ (Sen 1999).

3. Methodology and Data
This section outlines the data and calculations made to determine to what extent
revenues from carbon pricing would be sufficient to close the gaps in access to basic
infrastructure across all world regions.1 Section 3.1 starts by describing the data used to
estimate the gaps in access to the different types of infrastructure we chose to focus on.
Section 3.2. provides an overview of our cost calculations. Section 3.3. discusses the
scenarios used to assess revenues from carbon pricing. As access gaps and cost

1

Please note that our analysis is based on the extrapolation of empirical trends and does not consider
possible feedbacks of carbon pricing on access and infrastructure costs.
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estimates are described in detail in the companion paper (Fuss et al. 2015), we only
provide some key insights here. All data used are available online2.

3.1. Access to Infrastructure
The goal of this study is to determine whether revenues from emission would be
sufficient to cover investments to an extent that it would enable universal (i.e. 100%)
access water, sanitation, electricity and telecommunication, and allow paving of all
unpaved roads3. Arguably, these infrastructures are essential for human development in
the sense of creating the capabilities to allow people to pursue their aims (Drèze and
Sen 2013).
Access to water refers to the share of the population using an improved drinking water
source, such as piped water, public taps or standpipes, tube wells or boreholes (World
Bank 2014). Improved sanitation facilities include piped sewer systems, septic tanks, pit
latrines, and composting toilet (World Bank 2014). Electricity access measures the
percent of households with an electricity connection (Pachauri et al. 2013). For
telecommunication, having a mobile phone plus 10 minutes of airtime per day were
taken as a target (ITU 2014). Finally, for transportation, we examine the costs of paving
all currently unpaved roads (World Bank 2014).

2

http://www.mcc-berlin.net/fileadmin/user_upload/Jakob/Data_carbon_pricing_infrastructure_mike.xlsx
Access to roads is essential for e.g. access to markets (Jacoby 2000).We suppose that all unpaved roads
are in place because there is an actual need for them. Even though these roads do not necessarily need to
be paved to ensure access, paving would substantially ease transportation. Hence, the requirement of
paving all unpaved roads considered in this paper can be regarded as an upper limit for the investment
needs required to ensure access to transportation services.
3
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Region
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East & North
Africa
North America
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Global

% w/o
acccess
to elec.
4.8
0.0

% w/o
% w/o
acccess to acccess to
water
sanitation
8.8
30.6
2.0
6.5

% w/o
% of
acccess to unpaved
ICT
roads
29.3
40.1
14.2
23.1

5.2

6.2

18.4

23.0

81.8

5.3
0.0
25.6
68.1
16.8

9.2
0.8
10.6
36.7
11.3

11.1
0.1
61.8
69.6
36.0

13.8
1.1
67.9
59.8
37.4

21.9
0.0
46.9
79.6
31.6

Table 1: Share of population lacking access to electricity, water, sanitation, telecommunication and share
of unpaved roads by region according to World Bank classification. All data are for the year 2010. Source:
World Bank (2014), ITU (2014), Pachauri et al. (2013).

Table 1 provides an overview of access gaps aggregated on the regional level. These
gaps are in general most pronounced for Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than one third
of the population doesn’t have access to water, and more than two thirds lacks access
to electricity. Likewise, in South Asia, more than 60% lack access to sanitation, and more
than two thirds don’t have access to telecommunication.
For our analysis, we examine a scenario in which infrastructure investments are
undertaken over a horizon of 15 years, corresponding to the 2015-2030 timeframe of
the process to extend the Millennium Development Goals (Griggs et al. 2013). We
assume that without intervention, the share of the population lacking access to a certain
infrastructure in the year 2030 would be the same as in the year 2010 (hence our
estimates can be considered conservative, as with economic growth it can be expected
that access gaps start to shrink as part of the economy’s development process). The
access gap for each country is then calculated by multiplying this share with the medium
7

scenario of the population forecast for 2030 from the United Nations World Population
Prospects (UN 2013).

3.2. Costs of Providing Infrastructure
The costs for infrastructure access and paving roads were collected from the literature.
Where data for individual countries was not available, we used regional averages. For
recurrent costs, we assumed that infrastructure built-up is distributed equally over the
considered 15-year horizon, which yields an average time of 7.5 years for which these
expenses need to be met.
For the cost estimate of enabling universal access to clean water and sanitation, we rely
on the World Health Organization (WHO) study by Hutton (2012). For costs of electricity
access, which can be achieved by means of grid expansion or decentralized sources, we
employ cost projections from an energy systems model (Pachauri et al. 2013) as the
basis for our calculation. Concerning the costs of paving those unpaved roads, we use
data from the International Energy Agency (2013). Finally, cost for providing access to
mobile connections is assumed to be 150 US$ fixed costs per connection, which is line
with the range of different studies reported in Rothman et al. (2014). For the cost of
usage, we assume that 10 minutes of air time per day are to be covered, at a price of 2
cents per minute.
At global scale, our cost calculations indicate that universal access to water could be
achieved by investing US$ 190 bn per year, US$ 370 bn could cover universal access to
sanitation, and US$ 430 bn could finance universal access to electricity. Providing
8

universal access to telecommunication would amount to US$ 2.6 trn annually, and
paving all unpaved roads to US$ 8.7 trn.
The next sub-section examines the potential revenues of emission pricing under
different scenarios. These are then compared to infrastructure investment needs on the
country- level in Section 4.

3.3. Revenues from Emission Pricing
Estimating potential revenues requires the use of scenarios of future emissions and
emission levels. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) constitute the most frequently
employed tool to generate such scenarios (Luderer et al. 2011), which are inter alia used
as a basis for the assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of
technological transformation pathways and mitigation costs to achieve a certain
stabilization target (i.e. an atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases or
temperature increase not to be exceeded) (IPCC 2014b).
Figure 1 provides an overview of carbon prices and emissions in the year 2020 for the
RCP2.6 stabilization scenario, which has a high probability of achieving the 2°C target.
Scenario data include seven models used in the EMF-27 model comparison (Blanford,
Kriegler, and Tavoni 2014; Krey et al. 2014; Kriegler et al. 2014)4. The scenarios assume a
globally harmonized carbon price and full availability of low-carbon energy technologies
(such as renewables, nuclear, and carbon capture and storage (CCS)). As can be clearly

4

Scenarios were obtained from IIASA’s AR5 scenario database (https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/webapps/ene/AR5DB). The models included in EMF-27 are AIM-Enduse 12.1, GCAM 3.1, IMAGE 2.4, MESSAGE
V.4, POLES EMF27, REMIND 1.5, and WITCH EMF27.
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seen, models project roughly similar year 2020 emissions5 (x-axis) for a certain region
(with the exception of negative emissions in two regions for the GCAM model6), but a
large variation in carbon prices (y-axis), which range from less than US$ 20 to more than
US$ 120 per ton of CO2. This broad span is mostly explained by differences in
technological assumptions (e.g. on the availability of certain low-carbon energy sources,
or technology costs) and economic mechanisms across models.

Figure 1: Emissions and carbon prices in the year 2020 for the 450ppm scenario, which exhibits a high probability to
limit global warming in the year 2100 to below 2°C compared to the pre-industrial level. Data are from the EMF-27
model comparison (Blanford, Kriegler, and Tavoni 2014; Krey et al. 2014; Kriegler et al. 2014) for four regions: Asia
(blue), Latin America (red), Middle East and Africa (green) and the OECD (black). Negative emissions imply removal

5

All emissions referred to in this study are total CO2 emissions, i.e. including CO2 emissions from land use
change and industrial processes, but excluding non-CO2 GHGs, such as methane.
6
Negative emissions occur if more emissions are taken out of the atmosphere by e.g. afforestation or use
of biomass in combination with CCS than are released by e.g. the combustion of fossil fuels.

10

of emissions from the atmosphere from e.g. biomass and CCS (BECCS) or afforestation. The dashed iso-revenue
curves indicate all points that correspond to revenues of US$ 100 bn, 500 bn, and 1 trn, respectively.

Besides differences between models, different stabilization targets as well as restricted
availability of certain technologies influence the carbon price. That is, a less ambitious
mitigation target will result in a lower carbon price, whereas foregoing the use of CCS,
or restricting biomass use, will raise it. In order to get a better understanding for the
determinants of carbon prices, we perform a simple regression analysis, in which the
year 2020 carbon price in a stabilization scenario (for 450ppm and 550ppm, and with
full technological availability, limited biomass, as well as without CCS) is the dependent
variable. We regress these prices on dummy variables for the stabilization target (with
550ppm as the lower-bound benchmark), technological availability (with full-tech as the
benchmark) and a model-specific dummy variable (which gives the ceteris paribus
difference to the average) using OLS. As the results reported in Table 2 should not be
regarded as a draw from a random sample, standard errors and significance levels are
uninformative; rather, the results should be interpreted as conditional means.
VARIABLES
ppm450
noccs
limbio
ppm450_noccs
ppm450_limbio
aim
gcam

(1)
p2020

(2)
p2020

(3)
p2020

(4)
p2020

27.79
(37.99)
8.422
(37.99)
2.996
(37.99)
99.77*
(56.90)
16.27
(55.10)
15.23
(38.19)
-8.103
(38.19)

62.56**
(23.77)
52.08*
(28.94)
11.51
(28.18)

27.79
(39.34)
8.422
(39.34)
2.996
(39.34)
100.9*
(58.36)
16.07
(56.79)

63.67**
(24.15)
53.44*
(29.57)
11.79
(28.90)

-0.213
(36.36)
-23.54
(36.36)
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image
message
poles
remind
witch

22.79
(42.47)
-2.054
(38.19)
12.96
(38.19)
95.60**
(38.19)
14.87
(39.92)

1.050
(39.01)
-17.49
(36.36)
-2.475
(36.36)
80.16**
(36.36)
-7.919
(37.31)

Constant

Observations
R-squared

39
0.625

39
0.577

21.61
(27.82)

3.673
(23.40)

39
0.292

39
0.220

Table 2: Results of regression analysis to explain carbon prices in the year 2020 in
different stabilization scenarios. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1

For our preferred specification that includes model-specific dummies as well as
interaction terms for stabilization target and technology availability (first column), the
results indicate the following: first, for the case of full availability of technologies,
mitigation costs in the 450ppm scenario are on average about US$ 28 higher than for
the 550ppm scenario. Second, for the 550ppm scenario, excluding CCS and limiting
biomass use raises the carbon price moderately, by roughly US$ 8 and US$ 3,
respectively. Third, these technologies are significantly more important for the more
ambitious 450ppm scenario. That is, not having CCS available would then raise carbon
prices by more than US$ 108, and limiting biomass use by almost US$ 20. Finally, as
already highlighted in Figure 1, the difference of carbon prices between models is
significant, with the lowest values for GCAM, and the highest for REMIND.
For our revenue projections, we take the 450ppm scenario with full technology available
as a benchmark scenario (alternative scenarios are explored in the sensitivity analysis).
We take emissions and carbon prices from the POLES model, as this model yields the
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median revenues of the seven EMF-27 models (listed in footnote 3). As we require
revenues on country level for our analysis, we apply annual regional emission growth
rates in the period 2010-2030 from POLES to extrapolate from emissions in the year
2010. Further, as the model scenarios provide emission prices in 10-year intervals only,
we estimate annual prices by assuming a constant growth rate from 2010 to 2030.
Finally, we examine four different ways how revenues from a global carbon price could
be distributed across countries: (i) we analyze the case in which all countries apply a
(globally uniform) domestic carbon price, without redistribution of revenues between
countries. Following (Raupach et al. 2014), we also look at a scenario in which the share
of revenues is determined (ii) in proportion to actual emissions (w=0), (iii) in proportion
to population (w=1), and (iv) the average (w=0.5) of the former two schemes. These
schemes for revenue sharing (or burden sharing, respectively) can be regarded as
reflecting different notions of justice and political feasibility, similar to the equal-percapita allocation, grandfathering, and contraction-and-convergence schemes frequently
discussed for the allocation of emission permits.
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Figure 2: Annual average revenues from emission pricing during the period 2015-2030 in US$ bn for the
450ppm scenario with full availability of technologies. Model regions include developing Asia (ASIA), Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAM), Middle East and Africa (MAF), countries that were OECD members in 1990
(OECD90) and transition economies (REF).

The results – which will form the basis for our analysis – are displayed on a regional
aggregation in Figure 2. The figure reveals that revenues from carbon pricing would be
sizable. For instance, depending on the scheme according to which revenues are
distributed, funds raised by means of carbon pricing range from about US$ 400 bn to
US$ 800 bn for Asia, and US$ 150 bn to US$ 360 bn for the Middle East and Africa,
thereby significantly exceeding current levels of official development assistance (ODA),
which amounted to about US$ 135 in the year 2013 (OECD 2014). The extent to which
these revenues could contribute towards existing infrastructure access gaps will be the
subject of the following section. For the analysis we focus on the 450ppm scenario, and
the scheme in which revenues are shared as an average between a country’s share in
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global population and global emissions (i.e. w=0.5). Other scenarios are considered in
the sensitivity analysis (Section 5).

4. Results
This section discusses the extent to which existing infrastructure access gaps could be
covered by carbon pricing. Figure 3 displays the share of carbon pricing revenues that
would need to be invested in a particular infrastructure over a period of 15 years to
achieve universal access. A darker color denotes that a larger share of the revenues
would be required, i.e. a lower potential of carbon pricing to close access gaps. Light
blue indicates shares greater than one, which means that revenues would be insufficient
to fully close existing access gaps.
For water (panel a), the results indicate that carbon pricing revenues would be more
than sufficient to cover the costs of universal access for all countries for which data are
available. For most countries, the required share is relatively low (<5%). However, the
Yemen would require about 10% of the revenues, and Ecuador almost 20%, which is due
to the rather large access gap in the former of almost 50% of the population, and
relatively low emissions in the latter (which under our baseline assumption on revenue
sharing results in lower revenues than for countries displaying higher emissions). For
sanitation (panel b), carbon pricing revenues would also be more than sufficient to
cover investment needs, with only few countries requiring more than 5%. This holds
even for many countries with very low rates of access, such as India, which displays an
access gap of 66% of the population. Countries with higher requirements are located
15

mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa (with a maximum of 17% for the Chad) and Latin America
and the Caribbean (Haiti, Nicaragua and Bolivia). For investment in electricity
infrastructure (panel c), the highest shares of revenues are required for countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa, with ranges from 10-20% of carbon pricing revenues needed for
universal access. On the other hand, practically all countries in Latin America and Asia
could achieve universal access at 5% or less of their carbon pricing revenues, owing to
the lower access gaps as well as lower costs per connection (which are due to higher
population densities in these areas compared to Africa)7. For telecommunication (panel
d), many African countries would require rather large shares of 20-40% to achieve
universal access, whereas investment needs for most parts of Asia and Latin America are
below 20% of carbon pricing revenues (a notable exception is Myanmar, where access
to telecommunication is well below the regional average, such that a larger share of
revenues would be required for universal access). This suggests that at least some
countries might face limitations in terms of achieving universal access to
telecommunications when taking into account that some fraction of their revenues will
also be required to finance the other infrastructures under consideration. Finally, the
investment needed to pave all unpaved roads (panel e) would exceed carbon pricing
revenues several-fold for a number of countries. Interestingly, there is no clear regional
pattern for these countries, as they include the middle-income Lithuania, Hungary, and
Latvia, whereas for Africa, the required share only exceeds 100% for Guinea. This result

7

Note that providing universal electricity access would only have a small impact on emissions and hence
not contradict the goal of safeguarding environmental quality (Pachauri 2014; Rao, Riahi, and Grubler
2014).
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is due to the relatively high absolute amount of unpaved roads in the former countries
(i.e. the gap in percent of unpaved roads is lower there, but the absolute amount
higher). Revenues would also be insufficient for several Latin American countries
(Nicaragua, Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay) as well as New Zealand.
In summary, our results indicate that for all countries in our study universal access to
water, sanitation and electricity could be achieved during the period 2015-2030 by using
in total less than half of emission pricing revenues. For telecommunications, however,
the potential of our approach may face limitations for some countries, and for paving all
existing unpaved roads potential revenues from emission pricing are insufficient in
several cases.
In the next section, we assess the robustness of our results by testing for the impact of
different assumptions regarding the stabilization target and availability of low-carbon
technologies, which both have important consequences for the emission price. In
addition, we examine different schemes how the revenues of emission pricing are
shared across countries.
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Figure 3: Share of carbon pricing revenues required to finance universal access to infrastructure. (a) Water, (b) Sanitation, (c) Electricity, (d) Telecommunication, and (e) costs
of paving all unpaved roads. For description of data and sources see Section 3. Darker colors indicate higher shares, and light blue shares exceeding one. Grey areas denote
countries for which data are not available. Please note logarithmic scale.
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5. Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented above were derived for a scenario that assumes stabilization of
the atmospheric GHG concentration at 450ppm CO2-eq. with a full portfolio of
technology options. As the use of some technologies might be restricted either because
they might not be socially acceptable, more costly than expected, technologically
infeasible or associated with unforeseen risks or unacceptable trade-offs, we also
examine two alternative settings, in which the use of biomass is limited (low bio), and in
which CCS is assumed to be unavailable. Furthermore, we also examine scenarios aiming
at less ambitious climate targets, namely 550ppm CO2-eq. Finally, we analyse the four
different schemes to share global carbon pricing revenues described in Section 3.3. This
leaves us with a total 24 scenarios (3x2x4 for different assumptions on technologies, the
stabilization target, and the revenue sharing scheme). The required shares of carbon
pricing revenues for each infrastructure are shown on a regional aggregation that
corresponds to the POLES model regions from EMF27 (see Figure 3).
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Figure 4: Results of sensitivity analysis showing minimum and maximum investment requirements (whiskers) as
well as 25% and 75% quartiles for the infrastructures under consideration. Please note different scales.
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This analysis confirms that for water, sanitation and electricity, investment needs would
be significantly lower than revenues from carbon pricing even under scenarios in which
relatively low revenues are generated for regions with large access gaps, that is, under
scenarios in which revenues are either raised without redistribution (i.e. domestic
pricing) or in which high emitters receive a high share of those revenues (i.e.
proportional to actual emissions). For telecommunication, however, a large share of
almost 40% would be required for Asia in this case, and about 45% for Middle-East and
Africa, and investment requirements for paving all unpaved roads would exceed the
revenues from emission pricing for Asia as well as Latin America. On the other hand,
under scenarios in which a large share of the global revenues accrue to poor regions (i.e.
equal per-capita allocation of emission rights), even the costs of universal
telecommunication access as well as for paving roads would only amount to a moderate
fraction of carbon pricing revenues. For instance, only about 10% of revenues would be
required to pave all unpaved roads in Asia, and about 15% for Latin America.

6. Discussion and Conclusions
Access to basic infrastructures, such as water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunication
and transport, is an essential feature of human well-being. For this reason, these
services play an important role in existing development policies, such as the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and their extensions beyond 2015. In this paper we have
examined how these considerations can be combined with a broader perspective of
sustainable development, which includes the stability of natural systems, such as the
21

atmosphere, as a policy target. In particular, we have focused on the question of how
emission pricing – which constitutes the most frequently discussed policy to mitigate
climate change – can generate revenues to meet infrastructure investment needs.
In a companion paper (Fuss et al. 2015), we examine the potential to raise finance for
infrastructure investment by means of taxing natural resource rents. There, we find that
resource rents could cover a large share of these investment requirements, especially
for water, sanitation, and electricity.
Resource rents and carbon pricing revenues can be expected to be of a comparable
order of magnitude: the former about US$ 3 trn in the year 2011, the latter on average
about US$ 1.9 trn per year in our baseline scenario in the period 2015-2030. However,
in most of our scenarios, carbon pricing goes further in closing access gaps, even if no
revenues from carbon pricing are redistributed across countries. The reason is that
those countries with the highest resource endowments in many instances display
relatively small access gaps, whereas emissions are distributed more evenly, such that
proportionally higher revenues would accrue to countries with large access gaps.
In addition, whereas some parts of resource rents is already captured by governments,
e.g. by means of taxes, royalties, and state ownership. By contrast, emission pricing
would by and large constitute new funds. Hence, we conclude that at least in scenarios
aiming at ambitious climate stabilization with a high emission price, and under schemes
in which a sufficient share of global revenues goes to countries with high access gaps,
emission pricing holds even more promise than resource rent taxation as a funding
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source for infrastructure investment needs8. In summary, taking both contributions
together points to the fact that fiscal reform that acknowledges the natural
environment as an economic factor offers significant potential to promote sustainable
development.
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However, emission pricing schemes need to be designed in a way that avoids negative impacts on the
poorest members of a society (Rao 2012), and appropriate institutions and policies need to be in place to
avoid negative impacts of large financial transfer between countries (Jakob et al. 2014).
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